Published April 23, 2024 | Version v1
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I, You, and We: Beyond Individualism and Collectivism

Authors/Creators

  • 1. ROR icon University of Copenhagen

Description

This is an Accepted Manuscript version of the following article, accepted for publication in Australasian Philosophical Review. Zahavi, D. (2024). I, You, and We: Beyond Individualism and Collectivism. Australasian Philosophical Review, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2024.2302443. It is deposited under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.

Abstract (English)

The contemporary debate on collective intentionality in analytic philosophy has lasted several decades, but questions concerning the nature of ‘we’ and the relation between the individual and the community are obviously far older. We can find a particularly rich discussion in early phenomenology. Indeed, while starting out with an interest in the individual mind, phenomenologists began their exploration of dyadic forms of interpersonal relations shortly before the start of World War I and were already deeply engaged in extensive analyses of collective forms of intentionality a few years later. A distinctive feature of the phenomenological contribution was its exploration of the relation between the first- and second-person singular and the first-person plural perspectives. How are I, you, and we intertwined? The aim of this paper is to present some core insights from this early debate.

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Related works

Is previous version of
Journal article: 10.1080/24740500.2024.2302443 (DOI)

Funding

European Commission
WE - Who are we? Self-identity, Social Cognition, and Collective Intentionality 832940