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Published August 30, 2025 | Version v1
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Expertise and the Ethics of Trust - A Review

Authors/Creators

  • 1. ROR icon American University of Armenia
  • 2. University of Pardubice
  • 3. University of Tübingen

Description

This review paper on the ethical issues surrounding trust in experts focuses on epistemic trust and its ethical implications. The aim is to provide a useful background material for more discussions of public policy issues in this volume and also to provide resources for philosophical thinking relevant to the theme of Trust and Hope in a Time of Crisis, the research topic of the ETICA Horizon Europe.

This paper is divided into four headings: Part I maps key philosophical discussions of trust; Part II discusses the breakdown of trust; Part III focuses on the core issue in the ethics of trust and is divided into four subsections; Part IV deals with the question of distrust. We conclude with some suggestions for creating the conditions in which both trust and distrust have a socially, epistemic, and morally useful place, in the context of a climate of trust.

Files

1 ETICA_Yearbook Vol. 1 3045-3143 Baghramian Panizza pp. 1-39.pdf

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Additional details

Funding

European Commission
ETICA - Center for Ethics in Public Affairs 101187166

Dates

Issued
2025-09-09

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