Distributed Detection and Isolation of Covert Cyber Attacks for a Class of Interconnected Systems

This paper deals with a topology for a class of interconnected systems, referred to as a highly interconnected system, consisting of interconnected plants and local controllers. We address the respective cyber attack surfaces as well as a design approach for detection and isolation of covert cyber attacks. For each pair of plant and controller, a cyber attack is implemented by a malicious agent, and its detection and isolation are achieved by associating the controller with two observers. These observers estimate the states of the plant, and compare the estimated states to determine if a neighbouring plant is under a covert cyber attack. The paper presents the modelling of the topology, the analysis of the covertness of cyber attacks, the design approach for the detection and isolation as well as a required existence condition. Simulation results are provided for the application of the design approach to interconnected pendula systems that are subject to a covert cyber attack.