Why Internal Agent Markets Fail at Small Scale: Five Hypotheses Tested on a Multi-Objective GridWorld
Authors/Creators
Description
Can a “market” of competing internal modules—each with distinct preferences, staking their own resources on decisions, and subject to monopoly-breaking revolution mechanisms—produce better collective behavior than a single unified agent? We build a minimal experimental framework where multiple neural policy modules compete for action execution rights in a multi-resource GridWorld survival environment, testing five sequential hypotheses over more than fifty experimental configurations. We find that: (1) naive market competition collapses into monopoly; (2) an antitrust revolution mechanism successfully breaks monopoly and maintains diversity; (3) state-aware arbitration improves resource collection by 6× but does not surpass the single-agent baseline; (4) input-level differentiation via optimistic perceptual bias is cleaner than reward-level distortion; and (5) a learnable arbitrator achieves the first instance where the market surpasses the single agent on survival steps (83.3 vs. 73.6, with 3.5× lower variance). However, the market consistently underperforms in raw resource collection efficiency. We identify the coordination cost ceiling—the overhead of multi-module arbitration exceeds the benefit of specialization at small scale—as the fundamental limiting factor, and discuss conditions under which this ceiling may be overcome in larger systems.