Published August 16, 2026 | Version v2

Why Internal Agent Markets Fail at Small Scale: Seven Hypotheses on Competition, Complementarity, and Institutions in a Multi-Objective GridWorld

Authors/Creators

Description

Can a “market” of competing internal modules—each with distinct preferences, staking their own resources on decisions, and subject to monopoly-breaking revolution mechanisms—produce better collective behavior than a single unified agent? We build a minimal experimental framework where multiple neural policy modules compete for action execution rights in a multi-resource GridWorld survival environment, testing seven sequential hypotheses over more than sixty experimental configurations. We find that: (1) naive market competition collapses into monopoly; (2) an antitrust revolution mechanism successfully breaks monopoly and maintains diversity; (3) state-aware arbitration improves resource collection by 6× but does not surpass the single-agent baseline; (4) input-level differentiation via optimistic perceptual bias is cleaner than reward-level distortion; and (5) a learnable arbitrator achieves the first instance where the market surpasses the single agent on survival steps (83.3 vs. 73.6, with 3.5× lower variance). We then test the hypothesis that capability complementarity—giving each module an irreplaceable production ability—prevents the elimination of experts. We find that (6) complementarity alone is not sufficient: with a myopic arbitrator, specialist modules are economically starved and die before the arbitrator learns to use them, producing a “collective extinction” where the surviving monopolist starves together with the system. However, (7) complementarity combined with institutional protection—a capital floor (minimum living guarantee) and weight-preserving revival—yields a self-regulating market: all modules survive, selection distribution is healthy (41%/33%/27%), zero revolutions are triggered, and resource collection recovers from zero. Throughout, the market underperforms the single-agent baseline in raw collection efficiency; we attribute this to the coordination cost ceiling and identify complementarity and institutions as the two structural conditions under which internal markets avoid collapse, if not yet outperform.

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Why_Internal_Agent_Markets_Fail_at_Small_Scale__Seven_Hypotheses_on_Competition__Complementarity__and_Institutions_in_a_Multi_Objective_GridWorld.pdf