InvigoratEU Reimagining Enlargement: Visions for EU Policy towards the Western Balkans and the Association Trio (D9.1)

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and broader geopolitical instability revived the enlargement process, which had previously stagnated and effectively come to a halt. In rapid succession, Ukraine, Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Georgia (whose accession process has been suspended following democratic backsliding), were granted candidate status; accession negotiations were opened with Albania and North Macedonia in 2022; and several EU leaders proposed 2030 as the target date for the next wave of enlargement. This new momentum was largely driven by geopolitical considerations and the need to establish a stronger geopolitical Union rather than by the modernization logic rooted in merit-based approach structured by the candidate countries’ alignment with the acquis. Yet, the two are not mutually exclusive: modernizing candidates can fulfil geopolitical objectives, while geopolitical urgency can in turn act as a catalyst for deep-rooted reforms in candidate states. The tension lies in the pace: geopolitical concerns aim to speed up the process, while the modernization logic remains dependent on progress in accession negotiations. 

Drawing on strategic foresight methodology, this paper identifies the three drivers perceived as most consequential in defining the path of the Western Balkans (WB) and the candidate countries formerly referred to as the Association Trio into the Union and requiring policy priority. The security environment, including the outcome of the war in Ukraine and the weakening of the transatlantic alliance, is highlighted as the most critical driver for enlargement. This is followed by developments in bilateral disputes between candidate countries and EU member states, which can halt the enlargement process through the use of veto power. Lastly, public opinion and support for enlargement in both EU member states and candidate countries are pivotal, especially amidst continued electoral support of Euroskeptic parties within the EU and a growing distrust in the enlargement process among candidate countries.

Building upon these drivers, the paper develops a set of visions for the EU’s political agenda towards the region by 2035.  Although EU leaders have set 2030 as the target date, 2035 was selected as the analytical endpoint to allow for the development of a comprehensive and realistic phased timeline of staged accession. The preferred vision depicts the EU as a stronger geopolitical actor that has successfully conducted a number of enlargement rounds, with Moldova and Montenegro as full members while the others are at various stages of differentiated accession. Internal reforms, such as the extension of QMV, have taken place within the existing framework, thus not requiring the drafting and ratification of a new treaty which may have been subject to vetoes. The enlarged Union has also consolidated its role as a global player and stepped up as a mediator in bilateral disputes. This resulted in renewed credibility and momentum for the enlargement process as well as increased trust in the EU across both member states and candidate countries.

The alternative vision, or undesired scenario, portrays a Union unable to resolve internal stalemates and bilateral disputes, leading to a fragmented and ultimately stalled enlargement. Internal division, exacerbated by continued political support for Euroskeptic parties, prevented meaningful reforms within the EU. The Union’s inability to enlarge also prevented it from developing a coherent and unified response to persistent insecurity in its neighbourhood. These dynamics translated into record low support for enlargement within the Union and trust in the EU across candidate countries, with negative consequences on both its internal cohesion and external credibility.