Execution Is Not Proof: Why Post-Hoc Validation Fails in Modern Computational Systems

Modern computational systems commonly equate successful execution with correctness, relying on post-execution validation mechanisms such as testing, monitoring, auditing, and human review to assess validity after artifacts have already been produced. While historically sufficient for smaller and deterministic programs, this paradigm has become increasingly misaligned with contemporary systems that are distributed, automated, probabilistic, and safety-critical.

This paper argues that post-hoc validation is not merely insufficient, but structurally flawed. It demonstrates how allowing execution to complete under invalid states leads to wasted computation, protocol mismatch, silent semantic failure, and increased security, safety, and liability risk. Through concrete walkthroughs drawn from artificial intelligence, scientific computation, and safety-critical systems, the paper shows how invalid artifacts can appear plausible and trustworthy while remaining fundamentally incorrect or unauthorized.

The paper introduces validity by construction as an alternative architectural framing, in which execution completion is conditioned on satisfaction of governing constraints such that invalid artifacts are structurally unproducible. Under this model, execution itself becomes sufficient proof of validity. Rather than proposing specific implementations, the paper reframes validation as a structural property of execution and examines the implications of this shift for modern system design.