Historical Analysis of Reflected Vulnerabilities: The Evolution of Windows Defender Defenses

This report analyzes a historical class of security flaws known as “reflected vulnerabilities,”
which were once potent zero-day attack vectors targeting early Windows versions and antivirus
software. We examine classic exploitation techniques, such as parser attacks, packet fragmen-
tation, and syscall abuse, which could lead to remote code execution (RCE) or privilege esca-
lation. The objective is educational, demonstrating how modern defenses in Windows 11 and
Windows Defender—such as Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), Data Execution
Prevention (DEP), Control Flow Guard (CFG), and hardened parsers—have rendered this class
of vulnerabilities obsolete. Proof-of-concept (PoC) code is provided solely to illustrate histor-
ical concepts and is non-functional on modern systems, ensuring compliance with responsible
disclosure principles.