TENSOR EU Project

Part of EU Open Research Repository
Published June 20, 2024 | Version v1
Conference paper Open

File-Injection Attacks on Searchable Encryption, Based on Binomial Structures

Authors/Creators

  • 1. ROR icon Delft University of Technology

Description

One distinguishable feature of file-inject attacks on searchable encryption schemes is the 100% query recovery rate, i.e., confirming the corresponding keyword for each query. The main efficiency consideration of file-injection attacks is the number of injected files. In the work of Zhang et al. (USENIX 2016), |log2⁡|K|| injected files are required, each of which contains |K|/2 keywords for the keyword set K. Based on the construction of the uniform (s,n)-set, Wang et al. need fewer injected files when considering the threshold countermeasure. In this work, we propose a new attack that further reduces the number of injected files where Wang et al. need up to 38% more injections to achieve the same results. The attack is based on an increment (s,n)-set, which is also defined in this paper.

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File-Injection Attacks on Searchable Encryption, Based on Binomial Structures.pdf

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URL
https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1000.pdf

Funding

European Commission
TENSOR - Reliable biomeTric tEchNologies to asSist Police authorities in cOmbating terrorism and oRganized crime 101073920
European Commission
TANGO - Digital Technologies ActiNg as a Gatekeeper to information and data flOws 101070052
European Commission
REWIRE - REWiring the ComposItional Security VeRification and AssurancE of Systems of Systems Lifecycle 101070627
European Commission
MLSysOps - Machine Learning for Autonomic System Operation in the Heterogeneous Edge-Cloud Continuum 101092912

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