Published January 16, 2025 | Version v2
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Ontic Vagueness: The Argument from Freedom

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Abstract
 
Is reality intrinsically vague? If it is, can we set a theoretical limit  on the precision with which reality can be described? And if we can, what are the observable, physical implications of that limit?

This essay introduces a new philosophical argument for ontic vagueness, the argument from freedom. As it arises in the argument from freedom, ontic vagueness takes the form of the specific claim that perfect self-identity does not exist in the physical world: there does not exist any feature of nature A such that A=A. I call this claim the unreality of logic and interpret it as demarcating a concrete theoretical limit on the precision with which nature can be described, due to intrinsic vagueness.

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Created
2025-01-15