Income, Democracy, and Leader Turnover: INCOME, DEMOCRACY, AND LEADER TURNOVER
Treisman, Daniel
While some believe that economic development prompts democratization, others contend that both result from distant historical causes. Using the most comprehensive estimates of national
income available, I show that development is associated with more democratic government—
but mostly in the medium run (10 to 20 years). This is because higher income tends to induce
breakthroughs to more democratic politics only after an incumbent dictator leaves office. And
in the short run, faster economic growth increases the ruler's survival odds. Leader turnover
appears to matter because of selection: in authoritarian states reformist leaders tend to either
democratize or lose power relatively quickly, so long-serving leaders are rarely reformers.
Autocrats also become less activist after their first year in office. This logic helps explain why
dictators, concerned only to prolong their rule, often inadvertently prepare their countries for
jumps to democracy after they leave the scene.