Russian Propaganda of Aggression Against Ukraine (2014–2021)
- 1. Hryhorii Skovoroda University in Pereiaslav, Ukraine
Description
The article examines the features of information support for Russian aggression from 2014 to 2021. The purpose of the study is to highlight the principal means and principles of the information warfare of the Russian Federation, to clarify the main aspects of information support for its own aggression on the territory of Ukraine, and its development trends. The main directions and tools for spreading Russian propaganda have been clarified. The purpose of the Russian information campaigns and their consequences are identified. The general trends of Russian propaganda regarding the events in Ukraine are highlighted. The main resources implementing the Russian information policy have been identified. The sources of Russia's information and propaganda campaign have been revealed. It is proved that not only traditional media but also social networks were of great importance. Using all resources in the complex, Kremlin propagandists tried to justify their aggression in the eyes of their compatriots and the international community, as well as to create a negative image of Ukraine. Partly, this had particular consequences due to the systematic actions of the Russian mass media abroad. However, russia did not achieve crucial political goals. Peculiar attention is focused on the need to form countermeasures, especially in the context of the beginning of the acute phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war from February 24, 2022. It is important to understand that confrontation in the information field is an integral stage of the Russian-Ukrainian war. The new stage has somewhat actualised the importance of analysing the Russian mass media to understand the trends of changes in Russian propaganda and the formation of an optimal system of protection against it. However, there is a need for a detailed analysis of the Russian information campaign during 2014–2021. It is necessary to identify the trends that were inherent in 2022 and to predict the further development of information support for Russian aggression.
Files
Russian_Propaganda_of_Aggression_Against_Ukraine_2014_2021.pdf
Files
(287.5 kB)
Name | Size | Download all |
---|---|---|
md5:323a239c04f7f29e904f143e7e085990
|
287.5 kB | Preview Download |
Additional details
References
- Apetroe, A. С. (2016). Hybrid Warfare: From "war during peace" to "neo-imperialist ambitions". The case of Russia. Modelling the New Europe, 21, 97–128. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316509247_Hybrid_warfare_From_war_during_peace_to_neo-imperialist_ambitions_the_case_of_russia [in English].
- Finnin, R., & Grant, T. D. (2015, August 24). Don't call it a civil war – Ukraine's conflict is an act of Russian aggression. The Conversation Media Group. https://theconversation.com/dont-call-it-a-civil-war-ukraines-conflict-is-an-act-of-russian-aggression-46280 [in English].
- Gerasymchuk, S. (2021, September 23). Dezinformatorzy VIP: Nowy-stary rosyjski instrument wojny hybrydowej przeciwko Ukrainie i Polsce [VIP disinformers: New-old Russian instrument of hybrid warfare against Ukraine and Poland]. Forum Ekonomiczne. https://www.forum-ekonomiczne.pl/dezinformatorzy-vip-nowy-stary-rosyjski-instrument-wojny-hybrydowej-przeciwko-ukrainie-i-polsce/?lang=uk [in Polish].
- Giuliano, E. (2018). Who supported separatism in Donbas? Ethnicity and popular opinion at the start of the Ukraine crisis. Post-Soviet Affairs, 34(2-3), 158–178. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2018.1447769 [in English].
- Gosudarstvennaya Duma. (1999, March 5). O gosudarstvennoi politike Rossiiskoi Federatsii v otnoshenii sootechestvennikov za rubezhom [On the state policy of the Russian Federation in relation to compatriots abroad] (Federal Law N 99-FZ). Konsul'tant Plyus. http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_23178/ [in Russian].
- Horbulin, V. P. (Ed.). (2017). Svitova hibrydna viina: Ukrainskyi front [Global hybrid war: The Ukrainian front]. Natsionalnyi instytut stratehichnykh doslidzhen [in Ukrainian].
- Husarov, V. (2015, November 19). Skilky Rosiia vytrachaie na informatsiinu viinu v Ukraini [How much does Russia spend on information warfare in Ukraine]. Inform napalm. https://informnapalm.org/ua/skilky-rosiya-vytrachaye-na-informatsijnu-vijnu-v-ukrayini-infografika/ [in Ukrainian].
- Isakova, T., Hnatiuk, S., Dubov, D., Chernenko, T., & Barovska, A. (2016). Informatsiini vyklyky hibrydnoi viiny: Kontent, kanaly, mekhanizmy protydii: Analitychna dopovid [Informational challenges of hybrid warfare: Content, channels, countermeasures: Analytical report] (A. Barovska, Ed.). National Institute for Strategic Studies [in Ukrainian].
- Jaitner, M. (2015). Russian information warfare: Lessons from Ukraine. In K. Geers (Ed.), Cyber War in Perspective: Russian Aggression against Ukraine (Ch. 10, pp. 87–94). NATO CCD COE. https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/Ch10_CyberWarinPerspective_Jaitner.pdf [in English].
- Jones, K. (2019). Online disinformation and political discourse: Applying a human rights framework. Chatham House. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/11/online-disinformation-and-political-discourse-applying-human-rights-framework [in English].
- Kamusella, T. (2018). Hybrid war: Real casualties in Ukraine. Sprawy Narodowościowe, 50. https://doi.org/10.11649/sn.1637 [in English].
- Kemp, S. (2020, February 18). Digital 2020: Ukraine. Datareportal. https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2020-ukraine [in English].
- Kemp, S. (2021, February 12). Digital 2021: Ukraine. Datareportal. https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2021-ukraine [in English].
- Korsunskyi, S. (2022, April 20). Informatsiina skladova viiny: Yak Rosiia namahaietsia poslabyty pidtrymku Zakhodu [The information component of war: How Russia tries to weaken the support of the West]. Radio Svoboda. https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/informatsiyna-viyna-rosiyskyy-vplyv/31811302.html [in Ukrainian].
- Kotsur, V. V. (2019). Natsionalni menshyny Ukrainy v konteksti suspilno-politychnykh transformatsii 90-kh rr. XX st. – poch. XXI st. [National minorities of Ukraine in the context of socio-political transformations of 1990's of 20 century – beginning of 21 century] [Monograph]. Dombrovska Ya. M. [in Ukrainian].
- Malyk, Ya. (2015). Informatsiina viina i Ukraina [Information war and Ukraine]. Democratic Governance, 15. https://science.lpnu.ua/sites/default/files/journal-paper/2022/feb/26730/malyk.pdf [in Ukrainian].
- Novorodovskyi, V. (2020). Informatsiina bezpeka Ukrainy v umovakh rosiiskoi ahresii [Information security of Ukraine in the conditions of Russian aggression]. Society. Document. Communication Series: Historical sciences, 9, 150–179. https://doi.org/10.31470/2518-7600-2020-9-150-1179 [in Ukrainian].
- Prykhodko, D. P. (2018, October 25). Informatsiina viina Rosii proty Ukrainy: Pole boiu – svidomist liudei [Russia's information war against Ukraine: The battlefield is people's consciousness]. In Informatsiina ahresiia Rosiiskoi Federatsii proty Ukrainy [Information aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine] [Proceedings of the Seminar] (pp. 55–58). Ivan Kozhedub Kharkiv National Air Force University [in Ukrainian].
- Radchenko, A. I. (Ed.). (2015). Polityka intehratsii ukrainskoho suspilstva v konteksti vyklykiv ta zahroz podii na Donbasi: Natsionalna dopovid [The policy of integration of Ukrainian society in the context of challenges and threats of events in Donbas: National report]. Vizavi [in Ukrainian].
- RF zminyla pidkhid u vedenni informatsiinoi viiny proty Ukrainy [The Russian Federation has changed its approach in waging an information war against Ukraine]. (2020, July 31). Ukrinform. https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-society/3073912-rf-zminila-pidhid-u-vedenni-informacijnoi-vijni-proti-ukraini-ekspert.html [in Ukrainian].
- Sasyn, H. V. (2015). Informatsiina viina: sutnist, zasoby realizatsii, rezultaty ta mozhlyvosti protydii (na prykladi rosiiskoi ekspansii v ukrainskyi prostir) [The informational war: Essence, means of implementation, results and possibilities for counteraction (for example, Russian expansion in the Ukrainian space)]. Hrani, 3(119), 18–23 [in Ukrainian].
- Shuster, S. (2015, March 5). The global news network RT is the Russian government's main weapon in an intensifying information war with the West – and its top editor has a direct phone line to the Kremlin. Time. https://time.com/rt-putin/ [in English].
- Snegovaya, M. (2015). Putin's information warfare in Ukraine. Soviet origins of Russia's hybrid warfare (Russia report 1). Institute for the Study of War. https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Report%201%20Putin%27s%20Information%20Warfare%20in%20Ukraine-%20Soviet%20Origins%20of%20Russias%20Hybrid%20Warfare.pdf [in English].
- Top feikiv kremlivskoho rupora u 2020 rotsi [Top fakes of the Kremlin mouthpiece in 2020]. (2021, January 21). ArmyInform. https://armyinform.com.ua/2021/01/top-fejkiv-kremlivskogo-rupora-u-2020-roczi/ [in Ukrainian].
- Zolotukhin, D. (Ed.). (2018). Bila knyha spetsialnykh informatsiinykh operatsii proty Ukrainy 2014–2018 [White book of special information operations against Ukraine 2014–2018]. Meha-pres hrup [in Ukrainian].
- Zozulia, O. (2019, May 14). Feik yak instrument informatsiinoi viiny [Fake as a tool of information warfare]. Yurydychna Hazeta. https://yur-gazeta.com/publications/practice/inshe/feyk-yak-instrument-informaciynoyi-viyni.html [in Ukrainian].