Dataset Open Access
George Amponis;
Panagiotis Radoglou-Grammatikis;
George Nakas;
Maria Zevgara;
Sofia Giannakidou;
Savvas Ouzounidis;
George Kakamoukas;
Antonios Sarigiannidis
The 5GC PFCP Intrusion Detection Dataset was implemented following relevant methodological frameworks, including eleven features: (a) Complete Network Configuration, (b) Complete Traffic, (c) Labelled Dataset, (d) Complete Interaction, (e) Complete Capture, (f) Available Protocols, (g) Attack Diversity, (h) Heterogeneity, (i) Feature Set and (j) Metadata. A 5GC architecture was emulated, including the Network Slice Selection Function (NSSF), the Network Exposure Function (NEF), the Network Repository Function (NRF), the Policy Control Function (PCF), the User Data Management (UDM), the Access and Mobility Management Function (AF), the Authentication Server Function (AUSF), the Access Management Function (AMF), SMF, and UPF, in addition to a virtualised UE device, a virtualised gNodeB (gNB), and a cyberattacker impersonating a maliciously instantiated SMF. In particular, the following cyberattacks were performed:
The previous PFCP-related cyberattacks were executed, utilising penetration testing tools, such as Scapy. For each attack, a relevant folder is provided, including the network traffic and the network flow statistics for each entity. In particular, for each cyberattack, a folder is given, providing (a) the pcap files for each entity, (b) the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/ Internet Protocol (IP) network flow statistics for 120 seconds in a Comma-Separated Values (CSV) format and (c) the PFCP flow statistics for each entity (using different timeout values in terms of second (such as 45, 60, 75, 90, 120 and 240 seconds)). The TCP/IP network flow statistics were produced by using the CICFlowMeter, while the PFCP flow statistics were generated based on a Custom PFCP Flow Generator, taking full advantage of Scapy.
The users of this dataset are kindly asked to cite the following paper(s).
G. Amponis, P. Radoglou-Grammatikis, T. Lagkas, W. Mallouli, A. Cavalli, D. Klonidis, E. Markakis, and P. Sarigiannidis, “Threatening the 5G core via PFCP DOS attacks: The case of blocking UAV Communications”, EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking, vol. 2022, no. 1, 2022, doi: 10.1186/s13638-022-02204-5.
Name | Size | |
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5GC_PFCP_Intrusion_Detection_Dataset.pdf
md5:4606ad037a90b9d8c0ec7f57462be0c6 |
482.4 kB | Download |
Balanced PFCP APP Layer.zip
md5:8dd98374e7db112d0e1c8ceaad7656c2 |
186.1 kB | Download |
Balanced TCP-IP Layer.zip
md5:f966cd2895c33ef6c3ff3238a5effd02 |
4.4 MB | Download |
PFCP Session Deletion DoS Attack.zip
md5:3671d5d8e2c1a01d61fca93e309968f3 |
22.2 MB | Download |
PFCP Session Establishment DoS Attack.zip
md5:6ab5803f7be2b1b7218e1b8d087c7578 |
31.1 MB | Download |
PFCP Session Modification DoS Attack.zip
md5:431014a3d97a8c50c2d11a1e31ac96df |
49.2 MB | Download |
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Unique downloads | 183 |