Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin
Published December 31, 2018 | Version v1
Journal article Open

Time and truth: on the relationship between some metaphysical and semantic theses [Tempo e verdade: acerca das relações entre algumas teses metafísicas e semântica]

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  • 1. Universidade de Lisboa, Portugal

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In this article, I try to identify the right connexion between some metaphysical theses (eternalism and determinism) and some semantic theses (closed and open future). Having established that, I will then posit two principles (Metaphysical-Semantical Determination Principle and Semantical-Metaphysical Indetermination Principle), making them available to philosophical debates, such as the debate about future contingents and its variants. The principles in question summarize the contribution that the relations between those theses can offer when well established. We will eventually see that we cannot deduce those metaphysical theses from the semantic theses in question, although we can move from the metaphysical theses to the semantic theses.

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