Data from: Recombination as an enforcement mechanism of prosocial behavior in cooperating bacteria

Prosocial behavior is ubiquitous despite the relative fitness costs carried by cooperative individuals. However, the stability of cooperation in populations is fragile, and often maintained through enforcement. We propose that homologous recombination provides such a mechanism in bacteria. Using an agent-based model of recombination in a population of bacteria playing a public goods game, we demonstrate how changes in recombination rate affect the proportion of cooperating cells. In our model, recombination converts cells to a different strategy, either freeloading (cheaters) or cooperation, based on the strategies of neighboring cells and the recombination rate. Increasing the recombination rate expands the parameter space in which cooperators dominate freeloaders. However, increasing the recombination rate alone is neither sufficient nor necessary. Intermediate benefits of cooperation, lower population viscosity, and higher population size can promote cooperation in a population of cheater strains. Our findings demonstrate how recombination influences the persistence of cooperative behavior in bacteria.