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Published May 31, 2022 | Version v1
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Of Sheeple and People: Echo Chambers, Pseudo-Experts and the Corona Crisis

  • 1. University of Leeds
  • 2. ETH Zürich

Description

Throughout the COVID-19-crisis conspiracy theories and false information spread all around the globe. In this article, we want to suggest that the spreading and retainment of disinformation despite counter-evidence is best to be understood in the context of echo chambers as described by Chris Thi Nguyen. Moreover, we want to argue that people active in those echo chambers are at the same time perpetrators as well as victims of epistemic injustice to different amounts. Although this article cannot cover the phenomenon as a whole, we hope to outline a path for further investigation.

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References

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