Schelling, Nietzsche and (Ir)Rationalizing Religion

F. W. J. Schelling and Friedrich Nietzsche appear for all intents and purposes in opposite philosophical corners, especially when it concerns religion. Nietzsche makes no positive mention of Schelling’s thought and yet, there are strong resonances of Schelling in Nietzsche. In this paper, I will show how the later Schelling’s criticism of the way his contemporaries approach religion is echoed in Nietzsche’s philosophical assessment of religion. This concerns two issues: rationalizing and irrationalizing religion. Schelling and Nietzsche aim both to avoid two extremes, one where religion is the counterfeit double of philosophy and the other wherein religion is the absolute other of philosophy. One could say that they are looking for a non-Hegelian dialectical interaction of philosophy and religion. For Schelling, the first issue is that a rational religion takes away all that is interesting in religion from religion. Schelling’s purpose is to provide a philosophical foundation to take religion and revelation seriously in themselves, not as something that could be explained by reason. At the same time, Schelling advocates against those philosophical approaches of religion that make religion absolutely in excess of reason (fideism, irrationalism). This general strategy is mirrored in Nietzsche. For him, the first of these issues comes up in terms of the demythologization of religion, which evacuates from religion its more tantalizing elements through a historical approach to religion. The second issue regards a religion that refuses to interact dialectically with philosophy, which is discussed under the heading of the sovereignty of religion.