The Algorithmic Leviathan: A PESTEL Analysis of Power, Autonomy, and Franchise in the Epoch of Artificial General Intelligence
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This article examines how the progressive rollout of artificial intelligence, and prospectively artificial general intelligence (AGI), alters the equation between institutional power, human autonomy, individual agency and the democratic franchise. Treating AI as a "bureaucratic native" that realises the Weberian ideal of rule-bound, impersonal administration, it traces the shift of discretion from street-level to system-level and algorithmic bureaucracy, and then applies a PESTEL (Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Environmental, Legal) analysis. The political section argues for traceable audit trails over civic registries; the economic section offers a stylised illustration of the human labour share and contrasts Universal Basic Income with Universal Basic Capital; the social section draws on the Dutch SyRI judgment and the Rotterdam welfare-algorithm case; and the environmental and legal sections address the compute–energy trilemma, the GDPR, the EU AI Act as amended by the AI Omnibus, and Council of Europe Convention CETS No. 225.
Three comparative tables and five figures summarise the argument. The article concludes that the distribution of power in the AGI epoch will be determined less by the capability of the technology than by the legal, economic and institutional choices that encode meaningful human oversight, explanation and appeal.
**Keywords:** artificial general intelligence; PESTEL; algorithmic bureaucracy; artificial discretion; algorithmic due process; audit trails; labour share; Universal Basic Capital; data centres; EU AI Act; GDPR; CETS 225; KSCCN
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Mamun_Algorithmic_Leviathan_PESTEL.pdf
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- 10.5281/zenodo.22990607 (DOI)
- 10.5281/zenodo.22993577 (DOI)
References
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