Published October 21, 2026 | Version v1

Rural Sociology of Village Savings Group Loan Repayment Grace Period Rules and Member Exit Timing in Ghanaian Rural Associations: A Regression Discontinuity Analysis of Grace Thresholds

  • 1. Cheikh Anta Diop University (UCAD), Dakar

Description

Village savings groups in rural Ghana typically embed a repayment grace period before which a member may exit without penalty and after which exit triggers social and financial sanctions. the present analysis treats the grace period as a threshold rule and asks whether exit timing responds discontinuously to it. Because no field data are available, the study characterises the operating characteristics of a regression discontinuity design that would estimate the effect of crossing the grace threshold on exit timing. Using a before-after-control-impact estimator with a declared variance structure (between-cluster SD = 6.0, residual SD = 4.5, intraclass correlation = 0.64), power was estimated across 2000 design cells for cluster counts of 8, 16, 24 and 32 and effect sizes of 3, 5 and 8 percentage points. The analysis indicates that 52 clusters are required to detect a 5-percentage-point effect at 80% power. The grace period is a sociologically meaningful institution whose threshold logic is amenable to causal identification, and it specifies the design conditions under which that identification would be credible.

Notes

Published in African Rural Development Studies (Interdisciplinary -, vol 27, issue 10, pp 57-70. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23541881. A Pan-African Research Journals (PARJ Africa) publication, https://parj.africa

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