Published August 1, 2026 | Version v1

Sovereign Green Bonds and India's Climate Finance Strategy: An Empirical Assessment of Pricing, Demand, and Comparative Positioning

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India's Sovereign Green Bond (SGrB) programme, launched in January 2023, was designed to serve three purposes at once: to lower the government's own cost of borrowing through a pricing discount known as the greenium, to widen the base of climate-conscious investors, and to signal institutional credibility on climate commitments to international markets. This paper offers an empirical, data-grounded assessment of how far the programme has achieved these aims over its first three years of operation, drawing on Reserve Bank of India auction records, market commentary, and a comparative review of four other emerging-market sovereign issuers: Chile, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Poland. The analysis finds that India's greenium has been inconsistent rather than dependable: an early positive differential gave way to a confirmed negative greenium of 9 basis points at the August 2024 auction, meaning the government paid a premium rather than a discount to issue green. Investor demand, measured through subscription ratios, has also weakened over time, from 4.11 times the notified amount at the debut auction to close to parity by mid-2024. Placed alongside Chile, Indonesia, and Nigeria, India's cumulative issuance covers under 1 per cent of its own annual climate finance requirement, a smaller share than Chile's, though larger than Nigeria's. The paper concludes that SGrBs have, so far, functioned more effectively as an instrument of institutional signalling and market development than as a reliable source of cost savings, and it sets out specific, data-supported recommendations for improving reporting transparency, deepening the domestic investor base, and scaling issuance.

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Sovereign Green Bonds and India's Climate Finance Strategy An Empirical Assessment of Pricing, Demand, and Comparative Positioning.pdf

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Submitted
2026-08-01
Climate change has moved from being treated as a peripheral environmental concern to a central fiscal and macroeconomic one, particularly for large developing economies such as India. India has committed to reducing the emission intensity of its GDP by 45 per cent from 2005 levels by 2030 and to reaching net-zero emissions by 2070 (Government of India, 2022). Meeting these commitments requires climate finance on a scale that dwarfs current flows: estimates of the cumulative requirement by 2030 range up to ₹217.5 lakh crore, rising to ₹878.7 lakh crore by 2070 (Deloitte, 2025; Climate Risk Horizons, 2026).

References

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