REVISITING THE CONCEPT OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN RELATION TO SOCIAL WELL-BEING AND PROGRESS

This article revisits the concept of the individual in relation to social well-being and progress by examining the philosophical foundations of individualism and assessing their adequacy in light of contemporary interdisciplinary scholarship. Since the Enlightenment, Western thought has largely rested on the conception of the individual as a free, equal, and autonomous entity, separate from its social environment and capable of self-sufficiency. This reductionist premise treats the individual as both the origin and the sole constituent of society, explaining all complex social phenomena exclusively through individual action. Drawing on the Kantian tradition of moral autonomy, the article traces how the self-legislating subject became central to modern liberal philosophy. It then introduces the communitarian critique advanced by MacIntyre, who argues that moral agency is not exercised in isolation but is embedded in traditions and communal practices that precede and shape the self. The discussion proceeds to engage with contemporary relational perspectives, including the capabilities approach, theories of social recognition, dialogical conceptions of identity, and empirical research on social capital. These frameworks converge on the practical claim that social relationships are essential to human flourishing, yet they diverge on a deeper philosophical question: whether the individual choosing subject remains the basic unit of analysis or is itself a product of communal life with no meaningful existence apart from it. The article argues that this unresolved tension must be acknowledged rather than dissolved, and that a relational perspective one that treats autonomy as realized through relationships of recognition and cooperation rather than prior to them offers a more comprehensive framework for understanding social progress in the twenty-first century. In doing so, the article contributes to the ongoing philosophical debate by demonstrating that neither classical individualism nor collectivism alone can adequately account for the conditions under which human well-being and social advancement are achieved.