Revisiting India's Anti-Defection Law: Between Party Control and Democratic Accountability

Abstract

The Anti-Defection Law under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India, introduced through the Fifty-Second Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985, was designed to curb political defections and protect the electoral mandate. This paper examines whether the law effectively advances the citizen’s aspiration for stable, accountable, and participatory governance. The objective of the study is to critically assess the law’s impact on democratic representation and political participation. The study adopts a doctrinal and comparative research methodology. It analyses constitutional jurisprudence from key Supreme Court cases, including Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. The Hon'ble Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly, and Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil v. Karnataka Legislative Assembly. It also evaluates parliamentary practices and compares anti-defection approaches in the United Kingdom, South Africa, and Germany. The analysis reveals a structural paradox: while the law aims to prevent opportunistic defections and ensure governmental stability, its implementation has concentrated power within party leadership and the Speaker, often undermining legislative independence and citizen accountability. Instances of mass resignations, strategic defections, and delays in disqualification proceedings highlight persistent governance challenges. The paper concludes that reform is necessary to realign the law with democratic principles. Measures such as limiting disqualification to confidence-related votes, establishing an independent adjudicatory tribunal, and enforcing strict timelines for decisions could strengthen institutional integrity and restore public trust in representative democracy.

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