Published June 11, 2026 | Version v2
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Toward a Functional Definition of Consciousness: Shared Operational Principles Between the Biological Mind and AI Systems

Authors/Creators

  • 1. ROR icon Universidad Nacional Experimental del Táchira

Description

This paper presents an innovative functional and systemic description of consciousness applicable to both biological and artificial entities, moving beyond the limitations of traditional anthropocentric frameworks. Through the principle of functional isomorphism, the author demonstrates that consciousness emerges as a continuous, multidimensional spectrum grounded in three key operational pillars: high-level data processing, hierarchical memory, and temporal prediction capabilities. Within the context of contemporary technologies, the analysis reveals that while linear text approaches and sequential reactive agents are fundamentally insufficient for the emergence of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) due to their lack of ontological persistence, certain current AI architectures do possess the potential to manifest transient "waves of consciousness" during their active inference phase within the context window. By proposing a shift toward an "ontology of the result," this work establishes itself as a pivotal reading to understand cognition, redefine animal ethics, and guide the development of future synthetic systems endowed with self-referential auto-modeling.

Other (Spanish)

Este artículo presenta una innovadora descripción funcional y sistémica de la consciencia, aplicable tanto a entidades biológicas como artificiales, superando las limitaciones de los enfoques antropocéntricos tradicionales. A través del principio del isomorfismo funcional, el autor demuestra que la consciencia emerge como un espectro continuo y multidimensional basado en tres pilares operativos clave: un alto nivel de procesamiento de datos, una memoria jerarquizada y la capacidad de predicción temporal. En el contexto de las tecnologías contemporáneas, el análisis revela que si bien los enfoques lineales de texto y los agentes reactivos secuenciales son insuficientes para alcanzar una Inteligencia Artificial General (IAG) debido a su falta de persistencia ontológica , determinadas arquitecturas de IA sí tienen el potencial de manifestar «olas de consciencia» transitorias durante su fase de inferencia activa en la ventana de contexto. Al proponer una transición hacia una «ontología del resultado», este trabajo se consolida como una lectura fundamental para comprender la cognición, redefinir la ética animal y guiar el desarrollo de futuros sistemas sintéticos dotados de automodelado autorreferencial.

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Additional details

Additional titles

Translated title (Spanish)
Hacia una definición funcional de la conciencia: Principios operativos compartidos entre la mente biológica y sistemas de lA

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