Comparative Judicial Sovereignty Nationalism: The Rupture and Selective Performance of Coordinative Obligation in the Coordinate Space

This paper anatomizes the phenomenon of judicial elites across jurisdictions systematically failing to fulfill the coordinative obligation required by Soji Yamamoto's coordinate theory (coordination theory), utilizing the methodology of comparative sociology of law. Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu's concepts of field, habitus, and capital, this study compares the behavioral patterns of judicial elites across six typologies: Japan and India (Type Ia), the United Kingdom (Type Ib), France (Type Ic), Germany (Type Id), the United States and Israel (Type II), and Hungary (Type III), thereby establishing three propositions.

First, the evaluative axis in the coordinate theory is not "which nationalism" but "whether coordination was attempted." Germany, the UK, and France each made attempts at dialogue while maintaining robust sovereign pride. Second, there are two worst-case manifestations: the "Japanese model (unconscious absence)," where the very existence of the question is not even recognized, and the "Hungarian Orban model (conscious destruction)," which physically eliminated the actors responsible for such dialogue. Third, behind the phenomena observed as "inconsistency" lies a coherent selective pattern: the obligation "functions in the direction of expanding state authority and governmental interests, but is evaded in the direction of constraint."

Furthermore, in the United States, instead of active rejection by the judiciary, Congress and the executive branch became the primary battleground for coordinate-theoretical struggles—the three-tiered clash over the Gulf War Authorization for Use of Military Force and the invocation of Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution in Somalia stand as records of this, the details of which are deferred to "The Transformation of the Problem Domain in Coordinate Theory."

This paper does not present the philosophical grounding for "why the coordinative obligation is required." That question is deferred to "The Philosophical Foundations of Coordinate Theory." However, even if the basis for the coordinative obligation remains unresolved, the fact that judicial elites in various countries so precisely and selectively evade something paradoxically suggests the existence of that very thing being evaded—this is the question handed over to the reader.

Keywords: Coordinate theory, coordinative obligation, judicial sovereignty nationalism, comparative sociology of law, habitus, dialectical link, Lacuna Executionis