Meaning, Alternatives, and the Adjudicative Function: A Distilled SCT Expression
Authors/Creators
Description
Description: Meaning, Alternatives, and the Adjudicative Function
Core question: Why does recognized error feel qualitatively different from ordinary failure?
Central claim: A system can only be wrong if alternatives existed. Meaning itself depends on the maintained possibility of relating distinctions in more than one way. Cognition therefore includes a distinct function — the adjudicative function — concerned with preserving alternative accessibility within a meaning-landscape, a function not exhausted by the truth or utility of those alternatives.
Phenomenological anchor: The emotional weight of error reflects the withdrawal of endorsement from a previously trusted distinction — consciousness transitioning from "yes" to "no" from within.
What the paper is not: It is not a metaphysical claim about reality, not a neural implementation, not a formal theory of alternatives, and not a complete cognitive architecture. It is a short conceptual essay establishing a falsifiable architectural claim.
Falsification: If all apparent alternative-preservation reduces without remainder to prediction-error minimization, global broadcasting, or sensorimotor coordination, the adjudicative function would be unnecessary.
Contribution: A distinct, testable proposal about a cognitive function that existing frameworks (predictive processing, Global Workspace theory, enactivism) do not treat as primary.
Audience: Cognitive scientists, philosophers of mind, consciousness researchers, and theorists of learning, error, and deliberation.
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