Ambiguity as Strategy and Risk – U.S. Strategic Ambiguity and the Three-Actor Dilemma in the Taiwan Strait

This paper examines the US policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan not merely as a foreign policy instrument, but as a structural variable that is interpreted asymmetrically by the three main actors of the Taiwan Strait: the United States, Taiwan, and the People’s Republic of China. Drawing on the theory of international relations, particularly the realist approach to the balance of power and the constructivist analysis of threat perception, the study argues that strategic ambiguity is becoming a conflict-generating mechanism – despite the fact that it was designed to deter both Chinese aggression and Taiwan’s unilateral moves toward independence. The central argument of this study is that deliberate strategic ambiguity strengthens China’s incremental efforts to undermine Taiwan’s strategic agency, increases Taiwan’s strategic uncertainty, and narrows the US’s crisis management capacity. The paper introduces a three-actor analytical framework to show how different time horizons and decision-making logics interact and create instability, even though no single actor seeks deliberate escalation.