Horizontal Cooperation and the Alliances in Negros Occidental

How can inter-local cooperation persist in decentralized political systems characterized by electoral competition, leadership turnover, and fluid party affiliations? This article examines the durability of inter-local coastal governance alliances in Negros Occidental, Philippines. Focusing on three long-standing alliances – the Northern Negros Aquatic Resources Management and Advisory Council (NNARMAC), the Central Negros Council for Coastal Resources Development (CENECCORD), and the Southern Negros Coastal Development Management Council (SNCDMC) – it documents the coexistence of political volatility and institutional continuity across multiple electoral cycles. Despite repeated changes in local leadership and shifting partisan alignments, these alliances have maintained regular coordination, joint enforcement activities, and shared governance structures.

The article argues that this durability is institutionally produced. Drawing on a mechanism-focused qualitative design, it shows that cooperation is embedded in provincial ordinances, fiscal processes, administrative routines, and technical coordination structures that persist beyond individual political administrations. Four reinforcing mechanisms underpin this process: provincial embedding, alliance-level codification, routinized interaction, and pragmatic reciprocity. Together, these mechanisms reduce uncertainty, align incentives, and increase the costs of defection, enabling cooperation to persist across electoral cycles.

By shifting attention from the formation to the reproduction of cooperation, the article contributes to debates on decentralization and collective action. It demonstrates that durable cooperation among political rivals does not require stable political alignment but can emerge through institutional arrangements that structure interaction under conditions of political volatility.