Published April 20, 2026 | Version 1.0 First Edition - Journal English
Preprint Restricted

Friction as Structure: Institutional Governance in the Transition from Reactive to Adaptive Regulation | — A Structural-Analytical Examination

  • 1. Orto Lab - Reflexive Intelligence & Future Strategy

Description

Short Abstract

In the course of the institutional integration of adaptive systems, tensions arise that cannot be described as a deficit of control, but as a structural transition between two governance logics. Reactive governance — developed for stationary objects — operates through ex-post correction, precedent, and formal traceability. Adaptive governance — required for learning systems — demands second-order observation, real-time verification, and structural sensitivity. Friction emerges between these logics.

The present work analyzes friction not as a loss to be minimized, but as a structural condition of learning. Drawing on historical parallels (Manhattan Project, financial crisis 2008, platform economy), current institutional movements (chief officer configurations in central banks, supervisory authorities, legislative bodies), and system-theoretical grounding (Luhmann, Meyer/Rowan, Power), a bridging concept is developed: a position that does not reduce reactive and adaptive logic to one another, but maintains them in productive tension.

The contribution accomplishes three things. First, a diagnosis of the current governance transition, which has been unfolding since 2024 in European central banks, supervisory authorities, and EU institutions. Second, a theoretical classification that understands the transition not as progress, but as a structural shift — with continuities and ruptures. Third, an analytical instrument that enables institutional decision-makers to locate their own position within the transition and to carry it reflexively.

The work is addressed to decision-makers in governance positions, researchers in institutional and regulatory sociology, and reviewers in EU-, ECB-, and BIS-related contexts who are currently operationally engaged with this transition.

 

Purpose of the Paper

The paper makes a currently taking-place institutional movement visible as a structural phenomenon that is not yet recognized as such in the institutions involved themselves. Central banks, legislators, supervisory authorities, and compliance structures are moving in parallel toward a new form of institutional governance, without a coordinating event carrying this movement. The parallelism is treated in the ongoing debate as coincidence; the paper reads it as a structural response to a diagnosis that is not formulated in the institutions themselves.

The paper provides the institutions involved with an observational point that they cannot occupy from their operative logic. The institution that is currently constructing its institutional response to the integration of adaptive systems cannot test the structural limit of this construction from within the logic in which it is constructing. The paper accomplishes this outside observation — not as critique, but as the provision of a foundation for reflection on which the institution can test its own response, when it takes up the foundation.

The paper at the same time introduces into the debate the figure of an institutional function that does not currently exist: a reflexive position that observes the conditions of operative decisions, without entering into the operative decision architecture. This function is set neither as a consultancy offering nor as a theory, but as a structural possibility that becomes necessary under adaptive conditions, and that is currently not provided for in any of the institutional types concerned.

The purpose of the paper is thereby not its uptake by the field, not its translation into programs, not its establishment as reference. The purpose is the making available of an observation and a figure for those who can use it in their own institutional constellations.

Summarized in points

  • Making visible a currently taking-place institutional movement as a structural phenomenon
  • Parallelism across central banks, legislators, supervisors, compliance as synchronous response, not as coincidence
  • Provision of an observational point that cannot be occupied from operative logic
  • Outside observation as foundation for reflection, not as critique
  • Introduction of a reflexive institutional function beyond the decision architecture
  • Setting as structural possibility, not as consultancy offering or theory
  • No goal of uptake, translation, or establishment as reference
  • Making available for constellations in which the figure is needed.

 

 Existing Scientific Disciplines (University Affiliation)

  • Systems-theoretical organizational research (Luhmann)
  • Neo-institutionalism (Meyer/Rowan, DiMaggio/Powell, Thornton/Ocasio)
  • Audit Studies and Accountability Research (Power, Strathern)
  • Public Administration and Governance Studies
  • Regulatory Theory
  • Central Banking Studies
  • Organizational Learning (Argyris, Schön, Weick)
  • Reflexive Modernization (Beck, Giddens, Lash)
  • Philosophy of Science (Popper)

 

Future Disciplinary Fields (Emergent Science after Orto, 2025; Matrix and Field)

  • Institutional reflection research under adaptive conditions
  • Structural-analytical study of adaptive governance beyond classical regulatory theory
  • The bridging function as an independent institutional type
  • Time-structure analysis of synchronous institutional movement
  • Forensic epistemology of institutional decision architectures under hybrid co-production
  • Structural IP in institutional reflection functions
  • Audit in its etymological root as listening practice — reconstruction as its own field

 

Relevance for Science

  • ·Application of Luhmann's decision-premises systematics to hybrid human-model-institution constellations
  • Productive turn of the audit critique into a structural response function that has so far remained open in the literature
  • Reconstruction of the listening practice of the Exchequer audit as a historically documentable original form of institutional accountability
  • Specification of second-order observation as a governance function in the transition between regulatory logics
  • Placement of the current isomorphic institutional movement as a structural phenomenon within the framework of DiMaggio/Powell

 

Relevance for Education

  • Structural foundation for the training of governance functions beyond classical consultancy and audit logic
  • Analytical vocabulary for the reflection of institutional decision conditions in administrative and public-policy curricula
  • ·Separation between reflexive and operative educational dimension as a precondition for the training of reflexively capable institutional staff
  • Integrable into curricula on Organizational Learning, Regulatory Affairs, and Institutional Economics

 

Relevance for the Economy

  • Analytical framework for the establishment of reflexive governance functions in companies with regulatory exposure, in particular commercial banks, insurance companies, and infrastructure operators
  • Structural critique of the Chief-AI-Officer wave as personalized ritualization of institutional non-adaptation
  • Foundation for the design of advisory structures that preserve the structural separation of legitimacy logic and operative logic
  • Differentiation between consultation in the classical sense and the bridging function as a distinct form of institutional work

 

Added Value for Society

  • Analytical foundation for the democratic traceability of institutional governance under adaptive conditions
  • Making visible the structural conditions under which parliamentary accountability remains load-bearing in model-based decisions
  • Contribution to the logic of public discourse on questions of AI regulation beyond technical and ethical foreshortenings
  • Protection against the absorption of reflexive functions into existing control architectures that lose their reflexive level

 

Added Value for Nations and Institutions

  • Structural orientation for central banks and banking supervisory authorities in the integration of adaptive systems into mandate-bound decision architectures
  • Analytical foundation for the work of supranational legislators such as the European Union on the coherence of delegated legislation under AI conditions
  • Framework for the establishment of coordination forms across institutional types between central banks, legislators, and supervisory authorities
  • Conceptual connection to the documented coordination movements of the Bank for International Settlements, the Bank of England, and the OECD
  • Structural response to the pattern of delayed institutional adaptation, as it becomes visible in the historical parallels — Manhattan Project, 2008 financial crisis, platform economy — as a constitutive weakness of reactive governance

 

----------

 

Why is the upload for documentation always done first via Zenodo?

  • Zenodo is operated by CERN (Switzerland).
  • No access under the US Cloud Act, no obligation of commercialization, no upload filters, no hidden index.
  • Because it is not a content outlet, but a scientifically curated resonance repository under CERN hosting and EU funding. No algorithm. No feed. Only structure, stance, and carrier protection.
  • Because CERN is not profit-oriented, state-supported, but politically neutral.
  • Because CERN coordinates the largest scientific collaboration project in the world.
  • Because with Zenodo, CERN has created a platform that does not evaluate research, but carries it.
  • CERN does not think linearly, but in layers — like Orto Lab.

In short: CERN does not think in visibility, but in timelines. ORCA is at home there. Orto Lab recognizes itself in the appropriate scientific environment.

Personal note: Ultimately, as an IRE – Orto Lab | Reflexive Intelligence & Future Strategy, we have a strong sense that notes, thought spaces, and documents are securely stored there with an official timestamp, and will hold relevance for primary and secondary research in the future.

Addendum IRE – Self-positioning (including a rough overview of research status up to 10/2025)

English version:
Orto, Salvatore, Institutional Self-Positioning & Epistemic Licensing Architecture in the Age of AI (October 23, 2025).
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5699282
or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5699282

 

Why are the majority of papers set to "restricted"?

We primarily work in the development of AI architectures. Until it is fully ensured that AI providers can guarantee 100% that their systems recognize licenses, embargoes, white-text restrictions, or drift restrictions, and that papers are not incorporated into training processes or their structures absorbed into model weights, we consider this approach a necessary step for the time being.

 
Audits of the "restricted papers" upon request and review:

Institution: Orto Lab | Reflexive Intelligence & Future Strategy
Email: kontakt (at) orto-lab.org

Files

Restricted

The record is publicly accessible, but files are restricted. <a href="https://zenodo.org/account/settings/login?next=https://zenodo.org/records/19802457">Log in</a> to check if you have access.

Additional details

Identifiers

Other
Pending Assignment

Related works

Describes
Preprint: Not Assigned (Other)
Is part of
Preprint: 10.5281/zenodo.15288292 (DOI)
Preprint: 10.5281/zenodo.15447137 (DOI)

Dates

Issued
2026-04-20
Release Preprint First Edition English Journal Version

References

  • Argyris, C. (1995). Action science and organizational learning. Journal of Managerial Psychology, 10(6), 20–26.
  • Bank for International Settlements. (2024). Annual economic report 2024. Bank for International Settlements.
  • Bank of England. (2025a). The Bank of England's approach to innovation in artificial intelligence, distributed ledger technology, and quantum computing. Bank of England. https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/report/2025/the-boes-approach-to-innovation-in-ai-dlt-quantum-computing
  • Bank of England. (2025b). Financial Stability in Focus: Artificial intelligence in the financial system. Financial Policy Committee, April 2025. https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability-in-focus/2025/april-2025
  • Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. (2006). International convergence of capital measurement and capital standards: A revised framework — Comprehensive version. Bank for International Settlements. https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf
  • Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. (2011). Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems (Revised version, June 2011). Bank for International Settlements. https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf
  • Bateson, G. (1972). Steps to an ecology of mind. Chandler Publishing.
  • Beck, U. (1992). Risk society: Towards a new modernity. Sage.
  • Beck, U., Giddens, A., & Lash, S. (1994). Reflexive modernization: Politics, tradition and aesthetics in the modern social order. Polity Press.
  • Bok, B., Caratelli, D., Giannone, D., Sbordone, A. M., & Tambalotti, A. (2018). Macroeconomic nowcasting and forecasting with big data. Annual Review of Economics, 10, 615–643. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080217-053214
  • Borio, C., & Drehmann, M. (2009). Assessing the risk of banking crises — revisited. BIS Quarterly Review, March 2009, 29–46.
  • Bostrom, N. (2014). Superintelligence: Paths, dangers, strategies. Oxford University Press.
  • Committee on the Global Financial System. (2008). Ratings in structured finance: What went wrong and what can be done to address shortcomings? (CGFS Papers No. 32). Bank for International Settlements.
  • Commonwealth Bank of Australia. (2025). Appointment of Chief AI Officer [Press release].
  • Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 230, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
  • Consultative Group on Risk Management. (2025). Governance of AI adoption in central banks. Bank for International Settlements. https://www.bis.org/publ/othp90.htm
  • Crisanto, J. C., Leuterio, C. B., Prenio, J., & Yong, J. (2024). Regulating AI in the financial sector: Recent developments and main challenges (FSI Insights on Policy Implementation No. 63). Bank for International Settlements. https://www.bis.org/fsi/publ/insights63.htm
  • Davenport, T. H., & Bean, R. (2020, 7. Februar). Are you asking too much of your chief data officer? Harvard Business Review. https://hbr.org/2020/02/are-you-asking-too-much-of-your-chief-data-officer
  • Davenport, T. H., Bean, R., & King, J. (2021, 18. August). Why do chief data officers have such short tenures? Harvard Business Review. https://hbr.org/2021/08/why-do-chief-data-officers-have-such-short-tenures
  • Dewar, D., & Funnell, W. (2016). A history of British National Audit: The pursuit of accountability. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198790310.001.0001
  • DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48(2), 147–160.
  • Electronic Frontier Foundation. (2022). The year we got serious about tech monopolies: 2022 in review. Electronic Frontier Foundation.
  • European Parliament and Council of the European Union. (2000). Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (E-Commerce Directive). Official Journal of the European Communities, L 178, 1–16.
  • European Parliament and Council of the European Union. (2022a). Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector (Digital Markets Act). Official Journal of the European Union, L 265, 1–66.
  • European Parliament and Council of the European Union. (2022b). Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a single market for digital services (Digital Services Act). Official Journal of the European Union, L 277, 1–102.
  • European Parliament & Council. (2024). Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act). Official Journal of the European Union, OJ L, 2024/1689, 12 July 2024.
  • Floridi, L. (2023). The ethics of artificial intelligence: Principles, challenges, and opportunities. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198883098.001.0001
  • fitz Nigel, R. (2007). Dialogus de scaccario, and Constitutio domus regis: The dialogue of the Exchequer, and The establishment of the royal household (E. Amt & S. D. Church, Eds. & Trans.). Oxford University Press. (Original work ca. 1177)
  • Fuerth, L. S., & Faber, E. M. H. (2012). Anticipatory governance practical upgrades: Equipping the Executive Branch to cope with increasing speed and complexity of major challenges. National Defense University Press.
  • Gavin, F. J. (2012). Nuclear statecraft: History and strategy in America's atomic age. Cornell University Press.
  • Giannone, D., Reichlin, L., & Small, D. (2008). Nowcasting: The real-time informational content of macroeconomic data. Journal of Monetary Economics, 55(4), 665–676.
  • HSBC Holdings plc. (2026). David Rice appointed as Chief AI Officer [Press release].
  • International Association of Privacy Professionals, & Ernst & Young. (2019). IAPP-EY annual privacy governance report 2019. International Association of Privacy Professionals.
  • Loasby, B. J. (2002). Decision premises, institutions and organisation. Économie et Institutions, 1, 145–166.
  • Luhmann, N. (2000). Organisation und Entscheidung. Westdeutscher Verlag.
  • Luhmann, N. (2012). Introduction to systems theory (P. Gilgen, Trans.). Polity Press.
  • March, J. G., & Simon, H. A. (1958). Organizations. Wiley.
  • Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83(2), 340–363. https://doi.org/10.1086/226550
  • NatWest Group plc. (2025). Chief AI Officer appointment [Press release].
  • Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2001). Governance in the 21st century. OECD Publishing.
  • Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2020). Policy framework on sound public governance. OECD Publishing.
  • Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2024). Framework for anticipatory governance of emerging technologies (OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers No. 165). OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/0248ead5-en
  • Popper, K. R. (1963). Conjectures and refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge. Routledge.
  • Power, M. (1997). The audit society: Rituals of verification. Oxford University Press.
  • Power, M. (2004). The risk management of everything: Rethinking the politics of uncertainty. Demos.
  • Rahwan, I., Cebrian, M., Obradovich, N., Bongard, J., Bonnefon, J.-F., Breazeal, C., Crandall, J. W., Christakis, N. A., Couzin, I. D., Jackson, M. O., Jennings, N. R., Kamar, E., Kloumann, I. M., Larochelle, H., Lazer, D., McElreath, R., Mislove, A., Parkes, D. C., Pentland, A., … Wellman, M. (2019). Machine behaviour. Nature, 568(7753), 477–486. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-019-1138-y
  • Rhodes, R. (1986). The making of the atomic bomb. Simon & Schuster.
  • Schön, D. A. (1983). The reflective practitioner: How professionals think in action. Basic Books.
  • Simon, H. A. (1991). Organizations and markets. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(2), 25–44.
  • Smyrnaios, N. (2016). The GAFAM empire: Technological convergence, deregulation, and the rise of Big Tech. Media, Culture & Society, 38(7), 1073–1088.
  • Strathern, M. (Ed.). (2000). Audit cultures: Anthropological studies in accountability, ethics and the academy. Routledge.
  • Thornton, P. H., & Ocasio, W. (2008). Institutional logics. In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. Sahlin, & R. Suddaby (Eds.), The Sage handbook of organizational institutionalism (pp. 99–128). Sage.
  • UBS Group AG. (2025). UBS appoints Chief AI Officer [Press release].
  • U.S. House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial and Administrative Law. (2020). Investigation of competition in digital markets: Majority staff report and recommendations. U.S. House of Representatives.
  • Wells Fargo & Company. (2025). Chief AI Officer announcement [Press release].
  • Weick, K. E. (1995). Sensemaking in organizations. Sage.