ROSATOM: ¿Un vector de amenaza híbrida y coerción en la Zona Gris actual?

LEGAL REVIEW 

Pereira Bravo, Fernando. “ROSATOM: ¿Un vector de amenaza híbrida y coerción en la Zona Gris actual?” Boletín CODESEL, vol. 2, no. 8, April 2026, ISSN-e: 3045-7750.

The article develops a strategically incisive and analytically structured examination of the role of state-owned technological conglomerates as instruments of hybrid coercion within the contemporary “grey zone” of international competition. By focusing on ROSATOM, the Russian state nuclear corporation, the study situates itself at the intersection of international security, economic statecraft, and the evolving modalities of conflict that operate below the threshold of conventional armed confrontation.

The central thesis advanced by the article is that ROSATOM functions not merely as a commercial or industrial actor, but as an extension of Russian state power capable of generating strategic dependencies and, consequently, vulnerabilities within host states. This argument is grounded in the structural characteristics of the corporation, which controls the full nuclear fuel cycle, from uranium extraction to reactor construction and waste management, thereby occupying a dominant position in global nuclear markets . Such vertical integration enables the projection of influence across multiple domains, including energy supply, technological infrastructure, and long-term financial commitments.

From a conceptual standpoint, the article frames this phenomenon within the logic of hybrid warfare, employing the PMESII model to demonstrate how ROSATOM operates simultaneously across political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructural dimensions. In particular, the economic and energy dimensions are identified as primary vectors of influence, as control over nuclear energy production creates enduring dependencies that can be leveraged for political ends . The political dimension is equally salient, as large-scale infrastructure projects serve to shape the foreign policy orientations of recipient states, often through financial mechanisms such as state-backed loans and long-term contractual obligations.

The article’s empirical contribution is particularly notable in its use of case studies to illustrate the operationalization of these dynamics. The exclusion of ROSATOM from the Dukovany nuclear project in the Czech Republic, following concerns related to Russian intelligence activities, exemplifies how technological cooperation may be reinterpreted as a national security risk . Similarly, allegations of corruption and informal practices in South Africa highlight the potential for elite capture as a mechanism of influence. The situation in Ukraine, particularly regarding the Zaporizhzhia nuclear facility, underscores the direct intersection between nuclear infrastructure and military coercion, while Finland’s decision to terminate cooperation with ROSATOM and subsequently seek NATO membership illustrates the broader geopolitical ramifications of such dependencies.

From a legal-strategic perspective, the article implicitly raises critical questions regarding the classification of hybrid activities under international law. The conduct described does not easily fit within the traditional categories of use of force or armed attack under the UN Charter, yet it clearly produces coercive effects that may undermine the sovereignty and security of affected states. This ambiguity is characteristic of grey zone operations, where legal thresholds are deliberately avoided while strategic objectives are nonetheless pursued. In this context, the article contributes to the ongoing debate on whether existing legal frameworks are adequate to address forms of coercion that operate through economic and infrastructural leverage rather than direct military action.

A particularly compelling dimension of the analysis is the identification of hypothetical vectors of pressure that could be activated in scenarios of escalation. These include the interruption of energy supply under the guise of technical failure, the presence of foreign technical personnel within critical infrastructure, and the potential for cyber or physical sabotage . The Build-Own-Operate (BOO) model, exemplified by the Akkuyu nuclear plant in Turkey, is highlighted as a particularly significant mechanism, as it allows the Russian state to retain ownership and operational control of strategic infrastructure within foreign territory, thereby creating quasi-extraterritorial enclaves with potential security implications.

The article also engages with the broader implications of these dynamics for European security architecture. The dependence of certain states on Russian nuclear technology—reaching substantial proportions in countries such as Hungary or Armenia—introduces structural vulnerabilities that extend beyond the energy sector into the political and strategic domains . This dependence is not merely a matter of supply but of systemic resilience, as disruptions in energy infrastructure can have cascading effects on economic stability and social cohesion.

From a normative perspective, the study implicitly calls for a re-evaluation of the regulatory and strategic frameworks governing critical infrastructure and foreign investment in sensitive sectors. While existing mechanisms, such as the EU-NATO Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats, provide a basis for coordinated responses, the article suggests that their effectiveness depends on consistent implementation and political will. The emphasis on diversification of energy sources and the strengthening of societal resilience reflects a broader shift toward a holistic approach to security, encompassing not only military capabilities but also economic and infrastructural robustness.

The article offers a compelling and analytically robust contribution to the understanding of hybrid threats in the contemporary international system. By conceptualizing ROSATOM as a vector of coercion operating within the grey zone, it provides a valuable framework for analyzing how technological and economic instruments can be mobilized to achieve strategic objectives without crossing the threshold of armed conflict. Its integration of empirical evidence, strategic analysis, and implicit legal inquiry makes it particularly relevant for scholars and practitioners engaged in the evolving interface between security, law, and geopolitical competition.