¿Lex impotens? Realismo político vs derecho internacional

LEGAL REVIEW

Serrano García, Eugenio. “¿Lex impotens? Realismo político vs derecho internacional.” Boletín CODESEL, vol. 2, no. 8, April 2026, ISSN-e: 3045-7750.

The article “Lex impotens? Political Realism versus International Law” constitutes a theoretically grounded and analytically compelling reflection on one of the most enduring tensions in International Relations and Public International Law: the structural gap between normative legal frameworks and the strategic behavior of States. Framed within the intellectual tradition of political realism, the study interrogates the effective capacity of international law—particularly International Humanitarian Law (IHL)—to regulate State conduct in contexts of conflict and power competition.

From the outset, the author situates the problem within a context of geopolitical instability, emphasizing how contemporary conflicts reveal a persistent disjunction between legal obligation and political practice. Drawing on game theory—specifically the prisoner’s dilemma and Nash equilibrium—the article provides a persuasive analytical framework to explain why rational State actors may systematically defect from legal norms even when cooperation would yield collectively optimal outcomes. As illustrated in the table on page 5, mutual armament becomes the dominant strategy despite its suboptimal consequences, thus reflecting the structural incentives that undermine compliance with international law.

The conceptual backbone of the article lies in its engagement with classical and structural realism. The author mobilizes key figures such as Hans Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger, and Kenneth Waltz to argue that international politics is fundamentally governed by power, security, and national interest rather than legal or moral imperatives. In this sense, international law appears not as an autonomous normative order but as a contingent instrument, whose effectiveness is conditioned by the distribution of power within the international system. The invocation of Machiavelli reinforces this perspective, highlighting the enduring primacy of raison d’État over juridical constraints.

Importantly, the article does not dismiss international law outright but instead reframes its function. International Humanitarian Law is presented as a regulatory framework that mitigates the effects of armed conflict rather than preventing it, operating through the Geneva, Hague, and New York traditions. This doctrinal clarification is both accurate and necessary, as it avoids conflating the ius ad bellum with the ius in bello. However, the author convincingly demonstrates that even within its limited regulatory scope, IHL faces significant challenges of effectiveness due to the absence of centralized enforcement mechanisms.

A particularly valuable contribution of the article lies in its analysis of enforcement and accountability. The discussion of international institutions—especially the International Criminal Court and the United Nations Security Council—reveals the structural limitations inherent in a system lacking coercive authority. The example of the arrest warrant against Vladimir Putin underscores the gap between normative proclamation and practical enforcement, while the role of the veto power in the Security Council illustrates how institutional design reflects and perpetuates power asymmetries. These observations align closely with realist critiques of international organizations as instruments of hegemonic stabilization rather than neutral arbiters.

The article further explores the role of non-state actors and soft enforcement mechanisms, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and human rights bodies. While acknowledging their normative and monitoring functions, the author correctly notes their limited capacity to compel compliance in the absence of State cooperation. This reinforces the central thesis: the effectiveness of international law ultimately depends on the political will of States, particularly those with significant power capabilities.

From a methodological standpoint, the integration of legal analysis with theoretical insights from political science is one of the article’s greatest strengths. The use of game theory, combined with classical realist theory, provides a multidimensional framework that enhances explanatory depth. The visual materials—such as the facsimile of the 1864 Geneva Convention (page 2) and the Nash equilibrium illustration (page 5)—further support the argument by grounding abstract concepts in historical and analytical representations.

“Lex impotens?” is a sophisticated and intellectually coherent contribution that successfully bridges legal doctrine and political theory. It offers a nuanced understanding of the limits of international law without falling into normative nihilism, instead situating law within the broader strategic environment in which it operates. For scholars and practitioners alike, the article provides a valuable framework for understanding why international law often fails to constrain State behavior—and under what conditions it may nevertheless retain relevance.