The Incentive Compatibility of the Disclosure Incentive

The companion paper (Beier, 2026d) resolves the Grossman-Stiglitz paradox by introducing track record capital as a second return channel alongside trading profit. The resolution depends on two assumptions the companion paper did not formally establish: that honest disclosure is incentive-compatible in the multi-agent, multi-period setting the mechanism requires, and that the judgment market's return to calibration quality is independent of price efficiency. This paper provides both foundations. Truth-telling about report content is dominant under any strictly proper scoring rule (the classical result, extended here to sequential reporting). The strategic selection problem - agents publishing only where they expect high scores - is addressed through a coverage-adjusted score weighting accuracy at $\alpha$ and coverage at $1-\alpha$. The central result: under any strictly proper scoring rule with bounded range $[0,1]$ and $\alpha < 1/2$, honest comprehensive disclosure strictly dominates all withholding strategies for every agent regardless of calibration quality. The proof uses a worst-case analysis over all possible score profiles and is tight at $\alpha = 1/2$. The judgment market's independence from price efficiency is derived from a principal's delegation problem: the demand for calibrated judgment about future constraint environments is structurally independent of current price informativeness.

From the Prolegomena to the Unification of Economics, Computer Science, Mathematics, and Physics by Gregory Caldwell Beier (forthcoming 2026).

Keywords: mechanism design, incentive compatibility, proper scoring rules, calibration, delegation, judgment market, track record capital

JEL Codes: D82, D86, C72, D47, D02