Published March 30, 2026 | Version v1
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Compression, Causation, and the Sciences: Practical Implications of Observer-Relative Causal Structure

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Kriger (2026) argues that causation is not intrinsic to mind-independent reality but emerges relationally when bounded observers compress the undirected conditional independence structure of their environment into directed acyclic graphs. We develop the practical consequences of this thesis across four domains: clinical medicine, machine learning, ecological modeling, and quantum information science. We argue that the perspectival-relational framework does not weaken scientific practice but clarifies longstanding methodological disputes, provides a principled basis for tolerating causal pluralism in interdisciplinary research, and generates testable predictions about where causal modeling should break down. We conclude with a discussion of implications for science policy, particularly in contexts where competing causal narratives must be adjudicated for regulatory or public health purposes.

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