Perspective Ontology and Dimensional Logic

The present work develops an ontological foundation for dimensional logic (Stegemann, 2025a) that goes beyond its formal architecture. The starting point is a critique of Kant's concept of the thing-in-itself, which is rejected as a substance-realistic stage metaphor. In its place is a perspectival entity ontology: each entity constitutes its world through its own structural properties; there is no reality transcendent beyond these constitutional achievements. This position is shown as an epistemic-ontological circle, which is not considered an error in thinking, but a constitutive feature of finite existence. Against this background, dimensional logic appears as a species-specific coordinate system of human world order, a system that explicitly formalizes its own perspectivity as a fourth dimension and is thus more consistent than systems that make a species-neutral claim to universality without naming their own point of view. The article situates this position in relation to Kant, Leibniz, Nietzsche, Uexküll, Maturana/Varela, Whitehead and Heidegger and elaborates on both kinship and decisive differences.