SMART CONTRACTS AND CONFLICT OF LAWS: PROBLEMS OF 'PARTY AUTONOMY' IN AI-GOVERNED TRANSACTIONS

This thesis explores the doctrinal and practical challenges of applying the principle of party autonomy (lex voluntatis) to smart contracts and transactions governed by Artificial Intelligence (AI). The decentralized and immutable nature of Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) fundamentally disrupts traditional private international law connecting factors, such as "place of performance" or "habitual residence." The author analyzes how the Rome I Regulation and the Hague Principles on Choice of Law can be adapted to "code-is-law" ecosystems where enforcement is automated and often bypasses state judicial mechanisms. Special attention is paid to the tension between algorithmic execution and "overriding mandatory provisions" (lois de police), questioning whether an AI can recognize and apply mandatory public policy norms that usually override the chosen law. The paper proposes a hybrid regulatory approach "Lex Cryptographia" that embeds choice of law clauses directly into the smart contract's metadata to ensure legal certainty.