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Published February 7, 2026 | Version v1

ARC-1 Free Will as Admissible Commitment

Description

This paper analyzes free will as an admissible commitment structure rather than as a metaphysical capacity, causal power, or indeterministic mechanism. It argues that questions about freedom and agency become ill-posed when free will is treated as an ontic feature of agents or as a property that must be grounded in physical indeterminacy.

Within a closed admissibility framework, commitments function to stabilize reference, responsibility, and coordination across time. Free will is shown to consist in the admissible binding of future actions to present declarations under preserved standing, not in the ability to escape causation, prediction, or constraint. When free will is framed as metaphysical independence, debates collapse into irresolvable conflicts between determinism, randomness, and moral responsibility.

The analysis is eliminative. No psychological model, decision procedure, or normative theory is proposed. The paper instead establishes a boundary condition: free will claims are admissible only insofar as they express standing-preserving commitments that remain coherent across admissible redescriptions of the agent and the world.

By reclassifying free will as a commitment structure rather than a metaphysical property, the paper dissolves long-standing disputes between compatibilist and incompatibilist positions. It closes these debates by showing that they arise from illicit category shifts between representational commitment and ontological capacity, not from unresolved facts about physics or mind.

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