Published February 4, 2026 | Version v1
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Legibility, Power, and Bottlenecks: What the New Critical-Minerals Working Papers Reveal About Governance in the Energy Transition

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Description

Critical minerals policy has shifted from price/volume management to resilience and governance, but many debates still use commodity-market intuition. This paper synthesizes a 2024–early 2026 working-paper corpus and argues that outcomes are best understood as a coupled system: contracting and fiscal commitment devices shape investable surplus; refining and power chokepoints bind feasibility; enforcement creates diversion margins; measurement makes networks legible (and governable); and financial depth/tail risk constrains hedging and project finance. The corpus repeatedly shows heterogeneity is structural, not noise. Policy implications include refined-material stockpiles, feasible-set friend-shoring, diversion-aware due diligence, microdata exposure mapping, disciplined moonshot appraisal, and tail-regime stabilization tools.

Abstract

Critical minerals policy has shifted from a commodity-supply problem to a resilience-and-governance problem, yet much analysis still assumes that prices and volumes are the primary margins. This paper synthesizes a 2024–early 2026 working-paper corpus spanning development economics, macroeconomics, industrial policy, supply-chain empirics, and market microstructure. Using claim-level thematic coding (problem → mechanism → implication) and a complementary framing/agency audit inspired by Chomskyan critical methods, the paper shows that critical-minerals outcomes are best understood as a coupled system of interacting modules: institutions and contracting (fiscal commitment devices, oversight), chokepoints in refining and power, enforcement regimes with endogenous diversion, measurement infrastructures that render networks legible, and financial depth/tail-risk regimes that condition hedging and the cost of capital. Across themes, the corpus rejects coarse labels (“total rents,” “importer/exporter,” “safe haven”) in favor of structural heterogeneity—composition, intensity, buffering capacity, ownership complexity, conflict context, and concentration. The synthesis yields actionable implications: refined rather than ore stockpiling when processing binds; feasible-set approaches to diversification; diversion-aware enforcement supported by microdata mapping; independent appraisal and opportunity-cost discipline for mission projects; and stabilization tools designed for tail regimes.

Other

Keywords: Critical minerals; resource governance; refining chokepoints; stability clauses; friend-shoring; stockpiling; due diligence; supply-chain measurement; tail risk; industrial policy.
JEL codes: D23, F14, F52, G15, H25, L14, L52, O13, Q38

 


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Created
2026-02-04
Working Paper