Published February 4, 2026
| Version 0.9
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Wishocracy: Solving the Democratic Principal-Agent Problem Through Pairwise Preference Aggregation
Description
Representative democracy suffers from an inescapable principal-agent problem where elected officials' incentives diverge from citizen welfare. Wishocracy introduces RAPPA (Randomized Aggregated Pairwise Preference Allocation), which aggregates citizen preferences through cognitively tractable pairwise comparisons and creates accountability via Citizen Alignment Scores that channel electoral resources toward politicians who actually represent what citizens want.
Notes
Category: Academic Paper, Public Policy, Political Science | Genre: Political Science, Mechanism Design, Public Policy | Target Audience: Researchers, Policy Makers, Democracy Innovators, Political Scientists
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wishocracy-rappa-paper.pdf
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Additional details
Related works
- Is supplemented by
- Software documentation: https://wishocracy.warondisease.org (URL)
- Software: https://github.com/mikepsinn/wishocracy (URL)
Subjects
- Mechanism Design
- Collective Intelligence
- Direct Democracy
- Principal-Agent Problem
- Public Resource Allocation