Why Gauge Symmetry Cannot Be Ontic

This paper argues that gauge symmetry cannot coherently be interpreted as an ontic feature of physical reality. Treating gauge symmetry as representation-independent and physically constraining leads to a dilemma: either it redundantly restates constraints already imposed by locality and internal consistency, or it introduces unobservable surplus structure with no physical significance. In neither case does gauge symmetry qualify as a non-redundant ontic structure.

The analysis is purely structural and eliminative. It does not challenge the practical utility of gauge symmetry, nor does it propose an alternative ontology. Instead, it shows that gauge symmetry functions as a representational bookkeeping device that organizes local descriptions and tracks descriptive equivalences, rather than as a feature of the world itself.

The argument is independent of dynamics, empirical considerations, and any specific physical theory. It applies wherever locality and internal consistency are retained as non-negotiable constraints, and it remains unaffected by appeals to structural realism. Under these conditions, gauge symmetry realism is shown to be incoherent.