Why the Measurement Problem Is Not Dynamically Solvable - A Boundary Determination with Respect to Collapse Models, Many-Worlds, and Information-Based Ontologies

The measurement problem of quantum mechanics is predominantly treated in contemporary foundations research as an unresolved problem of dynamics or ontology. Accordingly, dominant solution approaches aim either at additional collapse mechanisms (e.g., GRW-type models), at ontological branching (Many-Worlds interpretations), or at an information-theoretic reinterpretation of state and measurement.
The present contribution advances a different thesis. It shows that, despite their methodological differences, these approaches share a common categorical presupposition: they treat the transition from possibility to facticity as an intra-worldly describable occurrence—whether as a dynamical process, an ontological splitting, or a state update. It is precisely this presupposition that is called into question here.
Starting from an ontological distinction between possibility and facticity, it is argued that measurement cannot be understood as a temporal event within an already structured world. Rather, it marks a boundary at which temporal, processual, and informational descriptions lose their applicability. The transition to objectivity is therefore not an explainable event, but an irreversible restriction of the space of possibility, through which world becomes factically binding in the first place.
Against this background, dynamical collapse models, Many-Worlds interpretations, and information-theoretic ontologies are comparatively analyzed. The aim is not a refutation of these approaches, but a precise boundary determination: it is shown in what way they each provide formally successful answers to partial aspects of the measurement problem, while at the same time presupposing the categorical status of facticization that they claim to explain.
The contribution does not understand itself as an alternative interpretation of quantum mechanics, but as an ontological clarification of its domain of validity. It proposes that the measurement problem should no longer be treated as the search for a hidden mechanism, but as an indication of a structural boundary of physical description itself.