Doctrinal Inconsistencies in Essential Religious Practices' Jurisprudence

Essential Religious Practices (ERP) doctrine under Article 25 and 26 of the Indian Constitution has become a significant yet contentious adjudicating tool in claims regarding religious freedom. The ERP test, which was created in the famous Shirur Mutt case, was meant to protect the autonomy of religious denominations by deferring to their own understanding of what constitutes essential practices. But in the last few decades, the judicial pronouncements have shown substantial doctrinal inconsistencies in interpretation and application of ERP. This article explores the growth of the ERP through important court decisions and identifies patterns of inconsistencies that have emerged. These include the subjective determination of essentiality by the judiciary, the dilution of the deferential standard established in Shirur Mutt and the inconsistent treatment of the difference between religious and secular practices. The paper highlights how the doctrine has become the instrument of judicial theology and has become increasingly detrimental to the goal of religious autonomy. It also highlights that these inconsistencies result in unpredictable and fragmented jurisprudence which negatively affects constitutional legitimacy and the rights of minorities. It ends by making a case for a theoretical recalibration, it advocates a shift to a rights-based, minimally interventionist model, which would better correspond with India’s pluralistic-secular constitutional scheme.