Weyl-Capacity Nash Equilibrium (WCNE): A Path-Space Equilibrium Concept for Non-Integrable Utility under Personal Capacity Limits Pontryagin-KKT Systems, Existence Proofs, Orbit Equilibria, and Welfare Analysis
Authors/Creators
Description
We introduce Weyl--Capacity Nash Equilibrium (WCNE), a Nash-type equilibrium concept for continuous-time games where agents (i) face personal capacity limits that constrain feasible adjustment and effort paths, and (ii) maximize Weyl path utility represented as a line integral of a marginal-utility one-form.
Curvature renders utility non-integrable, creating intrinsic path dependence and rotational incentives.
WCNE is defined in path space (open-loop and feedback) and nests standard constrained differential-game Nash equilibrium as the zero-curvature limit.
We provide full existence proofs using Berge's maximum theorem and Kakutani fixed points, derive Pontryagin--KKT systems with explicit complementarity conditions, and establish uniqueness criteria.
Three worked examples are solved in closed form: (i) a symmetric orbit equilibrium with purely endogenous cycles; (ii) an endogenous-capacity model with periodic $(x,k)$ dynamics; and (iii) an asymmetric two-player game demonstrating compromise orbits.
We prove that orbit equilibria require curvature, characterize their welfare properties relative to the flat limit, and provide numerical illustrations.
The paper formally separates WCNE from generalized Nash equilibrium and standard path-dependent models.
Keywords: Nash equilibrium; dierential games; capacity constraints; attention; path dependence;
curvature; Weyl utility; orbit equilibria; welfare.
JEL codes: C72, C73, D11, D60, D91.