"Critique of Searle's Distinction and Perceptual Ascription: From Ontological Intentionality to Cognitive Evolution in ECA"

This paper offers a critical reassessment of John Searle’s distinction between original and derived intentionality by shifting the analysis from ontological claims about biological substrates to a structural and epistemological account based on perceptual ascription. The paper argues that intentionality should not be treated as an intrinsic property possessed exclusively by biological systems, but as a graded, interpretive attribution grounded in predictive, explanatory, and contextual utility.

Building on this framework, the paper situates the ECA (Evolutionary Cognitive Architecture) model within contemporary philosophy of mind, showing how genuine cognitive evolution can occur without phenomenal consciousness or strong intentionality. By introducing a graded account of agency, normativity, and strategic reorganization, the paper demonstrates how artificial systems can undergo meaningful cognitive development while remaining non-conscious.

The analysis reframes classic debates surrounding the Chinese Room, understanding, and simulation, replacing binary distinctions with empirically tractable, structurally grounded criteria. The result is a philosophically rigorous alternative to biologically exclusive theories of mind, with implications for artificial intelligence, cognitive modeling, and the future study of intentionality.