A Trust Infrastructure Protocol for Asymmetric-Risk Markets

This protocol specification presents a trust infrastructure for markets characterized by asymmetric risk distribution, weak formal enforcement mechanisms, and high retaliation costs. Unlike conventional reputation systems, this protocol shifts epistemic authority to risk-bearing participants, uses quantile-based scoring to detect harmful patterns rather than average behavior, and employs cubic influence weighting to make retaliation mathematically ineffective. The system operates without identity escrow, centralized control, or permanent records, using demand-pull architecture where discovery occurs externally and screening happens only after contact. Key innovations include verification through single-use codes preventing fake reviews, asymmetric visibility protecting high-risk participants, and cooperative governance preventing platform capture. The protocol demonstrates domain-adaptable applications across sex work safety, ride-sharing, gig economy labor, campus dating, peer-to-peer exchange, entertainment industry screening, and restaurant labor markets. Mathematical robustness, governance replicability, technical minimalism, legal resilience through data minimization, and ethical consistency enable cross-domain implementation. The core contribution is a transferable protocol that makes pattern harm legible and expensive without making disclosure dangerous.