The Generation of the Experienced World: A Structural Framework for Experiential Constitution

Abstract

This paper proposes a structural model to explain the generation of the experienced world. It argues that the world experienced by the subject is not a direct mapping of external reality, but rather a result generated through the interaction of external input, cognitive rendering structures, meaning-endowment orientation, and the state of attachment (upādāna).

The "external input" (D) in this model does not assume the ontological status of the "Ding an sich" (thing-in-itself); instead, it serves merely as a directional reference to sources of reality that the subject cannot fully control or directly experience. The generation of the experienced world relies on the constitutive role of cognitive structures rather than a passive reception of reality.

On this basis, the paper constructs a cross-traditional framework for experience generation, functionally integrating core insights regarding experiential structures, attachment mechanisms, and the agency of meaning endowment from Kantian philosophy, Buddhism, and Yangmingism (Philosophy of Mind). By distinguishing between the theoretical core model, communicable expressions, and applied projections, this study demonstrates how the model can enter interdisciplinary discourse while maintaining structural consistency.