Published February 4, 2026
| Version 0.9
Working paper
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Incentive Alignment Bonds: Making Public Goods Financially and Politically Profitable
Description
Government spending correlates with lobbying intensity, not marginal societal value. Programs with
benefit-cost ratios exceeding 100:1 (vaccines, e-governance) receive single-digit billions while programs
with negative net returns (military beyond deterrence, fossil fuel subsidies) receive hundreds of billions.
This paper introduces Incentive Alignment Bonds (IABs), financial instruments that realign politician
incentives with net societal value optimization. IABs create a capital pool that rewards politicians
(via campaign support and post-office career opportunities) for funding high-NSV programs over low-NSV
alternatives. The mechanism requires no legislative change: existing PAC infrastructure, impact bonds, and
prediction markets can deploy it today. Analysis of a proposed 1% Treaty redirecting $27.2B
annually from military spending to medical research shows expected returns exceeding 100:1 for early
investors. The 90:1 capital asymmetry ($454T in household wealth vs.
$5T for concentrated interests) means diffuse
beneficiaries can outspend incumbent lobbies once coordination problems are solved. IABs solve that
coordination problem by turning political change into an investable asset class.
Notes
Files
incentive-alignment-bonds-paper.pdf
Additional details
Related works
- Is supplemented by
- Software documentation: https://iab.warondisease.org (URL)
- Software: https://github.com/mikepsinn/disease-eradication-plan (URL)
Subjects
- Mechanism Design
- Public Choice
- Political Economy
- Collective Action
- Campaign Finance