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Published February 4, 2026 | Version 0.9

Incentive Alignment Bonds: Making Public Goods Financially and Politically Profitable

Authors/Creators

  • 1. Institute for Accelerated Medicine

Description

Government spending correlates with lobbying intensity, not marginal societal value. Programs with benefit-cost ratios exceeding 100:1 (vaccines, e-governance) receive single-digit billions while programs with negative net returns (military beyond deterrence, fossil fuel subsidies) receive hundreds of billions. This paper introduces Incentive Alignment Bonds (IABs), financial instruments that realign politician incentives with net societal value optimization. IABs create a capital pool that rewards politicians (via campaign support and post-office career opportunities) for funding high-NSV programs over low-NSV alternatives. The mechanism requires no legislative change: existing PAC infrastructure, impact bonds, and prediction markets can deploy it today. Analysis of a proposed 1% Treaty redirecting $27.2B annually from military spending to medical research shows expected returns exceeding 100:1 for early investors. The 90:1 capital asymmetry ($454T in household wealth vs. $5T for concentrated interests) means diffuse beneficiaries can outspend incumbent lobbies once coordination problems are solved. IABs solve that coordination problem by turning political change into an investable asset class.

Notes

Category: Academic Paper, Political Economy, Mechanism Design, Public Policy | Genre: Political Science, Economics, Mechanism Design, Public Policy | Target Audience: Researchers, Policy Makers, Political Scientists, Economists, Political Reform Advocates

Files

incentive-alignment-bonds-paper.pdf

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Additional details

Related works

Is supplemented by
Software documentation: https://iab.warondisease.org (URL)
Software: https://github.com/mikepsinn/disease-eradication-plan (URL)

Subjects

Mechanism Design
Public Choice
Political Economy
Collective Action
Campaign Finance