Sensibility and Transcendental Illusion: Three Core Tensions

In this talk, I argue that Kant advances an exceptionally broad conception of sensibility when considering its role in generating the error of transcendental illusion. My aim is to show that this perspective helps resolve three closely related interpretative tensions.
First, in the opening paragraph of the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant claims that all errors result from “the unnoticed influence of sensibility on understanding, through which it happens that the subjective grounds of judgment join with the objective ones,
and make the latter deviate from their destination” (A294/B350–1). This claim appears to conflict with Kant’s attribution of transcendental illusion to pure reason—to the extent that Grier, in her influential study (2003, 102–111), argues that this paragraph presents an account of error entirely distinct from that of transcendental illusion.
Second, Kant identifies three primary causes of transcendental illusion: the deceptive belief of transcendental realism, described as a prejudice or superstition (e.g., A740/B768; 5:294); a need for totality (e.g., A307–8/B364; A653/B681); and moral
hopes (e.g., A298/B354–5; A796/B824). This is perplexing, since it is unclear how pure reason, conceived as a faculty of discursive abstract thought, can be the bearer of psychological elements such as prejudice, need, or hope.
Third, Kant repeatedly claims that transcendental illusion arises “unavoidably” (e.g., A298/B354; A341/B399). As many have noted (e.g., Grier 2003; Allison 2004; Proops 2021), this appears to undermine pure reason’s capacity for self-correction—an
outcome that would call into question the very project of the Critique of Pure Reason.
To resolve these tensions, I draw on Kant’s logic, where his account of error relies on a broad conception of sensibility that borders on psychological activity by including various “powers of the mind” (Gemüthskräfte). In this context, error is said to result from sensibility insofar as it encompasses elements such as imagination, inclination, and habit (V-Lo/Philippi, 24:403; V-Lo/Bauch, LV 1:105), or haste, habit, and miscalculation (Refl. 2142, 16:250). I argue that such elements pertain to sensibility not
because they necessarily originate in it, but because they are received, activated, or developed through sensible interaction. On this view, sensibility contributes to error not by producing it, but by constituting the sensible condition that enables the exercise of “subjective grounds” in conjunction with objective ones.
If this interpretation is correct, then first, it is not sensibility narrowly understood as a cognitive faculty, but the sensible exercise of reason that leads us to succumb to transcendental illusion. Second, it is not the structure of pure reason itself, but its
development within experience that associates it with psychological elements such as prejudices, needs, and hopes. Third, transcendental illusion is thus unavoidable insofar as it necessarily arises in the course of experience, but it remains correctable insofar as it does not belong to the structure of pure reason itself.
I conclude by noting a potential limitation of this interpretation: it may be difficult to reconcile this broad conception of sensibility with its narrower, formal portrayal in other contexts, such as the Transcendental Aesthetic.