Gratitude as Moral Virtue: An Evaluation of Benefactor-Centred Accounts

This essay examines how gratitude can qualify as a moral virtue, arguing that the benefactor-centred account, particularly as articulated by Navarro and Tudge (2020), provides the most convincing philosophical framework. The paper defends the position that virtuous gratitude requires four essential elements: a benefactor who is a moral agent, a benefit expressing goodwill, a beneficiary who recognizes this goodwill, and autonomous motivation to reciprocate.

The essay evaluates competing accounts of gratitude, including McAleer's (2012) propositional gratitude based on humility and Carr's (2013) pluralistic approach. Drawing on classical sources (Seneca) and contemporary virtue ethics, it argues that benefactor-centred accounts best explain why ingratitude is condemned as a vice, preserve gratitude's distinctiveness as a virtue, and provide clear guidance for moral education and character development.

The analysis applies this framework to contemporary questions about artificial intelligence, examining whether current AI systems can be appropriate objects of virtuous gratitude. The paper demonstrates that current AI lacks the moral agency required to be benefactors, supporting the benefactor-centred view that virtuous gratitude necessarily involves reciprocal relationships between moral agents.