Abortion Inconsistency Arguments - A Category Mistake in Simkulet's Defence

Abstract (En)

Abortion is one of the moral issues that has generated endless debates in the field
of ethics. While its opponents (the prolife) reject abortion because a child has a
right to live from the moment of conception and that the life should be preserved
from that moment, its proponents (the prochoice) accept abortion based on
respect for the right of the mother to choose what happens in her body. Among
the criticisms against the prolife are abortion inconsistency arguments. In them,
the prochoice argue that the prolife are inconsistent by opposing abortion while
being silent about other ill conditions of life, like the dying of foetuses through
miscarriage and the freezing and destruction of excess IVF embryos. William
Simkulet, a proponent of this theory, like others, argues that either the opponents
of abortion do more by equally engaging in other issues of life preservation rather
than just opposing abortion, or, they should refrain from opposing abortion.
Emphatic in his criticism is his view that the opponents of abortion neglect the
prevention of miscarriage, which he sees as a point of inconsistency. This paper
critiques Simkulet’s inconsistency arguments. With an expository and analytical
method, the paper argues that Simkulet falls into a category mistake in his
treatment of miscarriage as if it belongs to the same category as abortion in moral
evaluation. This undermines his inconsistency arguments and makes them
implausible.