A Wittgensteinian Reassessment of "Subjective" and "Interpretivist" Epistemology

A Wittgensteinian Reassessment of “Subjective” and “Interpretivist” Epistemology
Alexey A. Nekludoff (AstraVerge Institute)

This preprint offers a structural reinterpretation of the traditional distinction between subjective epistemology and interpretivist epistemology. Drawing on Wittgenstein’s conception of the metaphysical subject as “the limit of the world,” the paper argues that the commonly assumed contrast between individual and socially shared meaning-making does not reflect a difference in epistemic mechanism. Instead, both frameworks rely on the same underlying architecture of sense-boundary formation.

The analysis shows that:

• “Shared meaning” is not an independently observable entity, but an inferential reconstruction of synchronized individual loci of sense.

• Interpretivist epistemology introduces multiplicity, not a new epistemic process.

• Subjective epistemology and interpretivist epistemology differ only by the number of structurally equivalent sense-boundaries, not by their nature.

• Wittgenstein’s structural notion of the subject dissolves the classical subject–object divide and allows a non-anthropocentric interpretation of loci of sense (including archaeological alignment structures such as Stonehenge).

As a result, the standard epistemological dichotomy collapses: interpretivism becomes a scaled version of subjectivity rather than an alternative foundation.

This work also outlines two implications of Wittgenstein’s model:
(1) a phenomenon—the erosion of the subject/object distinction;
(2) a paradox—a structural reading of Nietzsche’s aphorism “When you gaze into the abyss, the abyss also gazes into you.”

The paper establishes a conceptual bridge between 20th-century analytic philosophy and contemporary structural ontologies, preparing ground for broader meta-ontological frameworks such as the Philosophy of Discrete Being (FDB).