III – THE DYNAMICS OF KNOWLEDGE

In the two preceding articles, we defined knowledge as the representation of the world

within the mind. In this paper, we examine the processes through which such

representation is constructed and sustained. The discussion is grounded in Piaget’s

concept of schema, which in his genetic epistemology constitutes the basic unit of

knowledge. We argue that these schemas emerge from the relationship between

concepts stored in Quiroga’s neurons, activated through words (signifiers), in

accordance with Saussure’s theory of evocation. In this framework, language can be

conceived as the set of rules that determine how conceptual neurons are successively

activated and interconnected, following grammatical structures and giving rise to

thought as the manipulation of schemas. Programming language would thus correspond

to Fodor’s (1975) notion of mentalese, conceived around Chomsky’s universal

grammar.

To describe these processes, we draw on logical and conditional operators common to

programming languages, particularly conjunction (AND), disjunction (OR), and the

conditional (IF–THEN). In this view, the mental representation of the world occurs

through schemas or networks of schemas that articulate the rules governing reality.

Piagetian mechanisms of assimilation—understood as the reinforcement of confidence

in a given representation—and of disequilibrium and accommodation—as the engine

for replacing one representation with a more accurate one—are introduced as

explanatory tools.

2

Finally, Kuhn’s theory is presented to illustrate how the problem of increasing precision

in scientific representations is resolved within scientific communities. The process, we

argue, is strikingly analogous to Piaget’s account of individual cognitive development.

This parallel suggests that both reflect a —possibly unique— mechanism of knowledge

improvement: the Hegelian dialectic.